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SEC P R A C TIC E SEC TIO N
A IC P A D IV IS IO N FOR CPA FIR M S

STATEM ENT OF P O S IT IO N R EG A RD IN G M ANDATORY
ROTATION OF A U D IT FIR M S OF PU BLIC LY HELD C O M P A N IE S
Periodically, some observers of the public accounting profession have suggested that the quality of audits
could be improved if audit firm rotation were required after some specified period. This recommendation
rests on the premise that establishing a long-term client relationship can impair the auditors’ objectivity.
The American Institute of CPAs, with approximately 305,000 members, is continually pursuing initiatives
to enhance the quality of audits. As a result, any suggestion to enhance audit quality and objectivity is
seriously considered. However, after studying the question of audit firm rotation, the Institute has con
cluded that there is no credible evidence that such a requirement would improve the quality of audits.
To the contrary, the Institute believes that mandatory audit firm rotation would not be in the public
interest. For one thing, it would dramatically increase costs for firms, clients and the public. In addition,
it would increase the likelihood of poor audits, by depriving auditors of a most valuable tool: experience
with a client and the resulting comprehensive knowledge of its business and operations.
This paper explains why mandatory audit firm rotation is not in the public interest. After reviewing the
perceived problems that audit firm rotation claims to address, it discusses the costs and drawbacks of
rotation; describes the expanding role of the auditor and the importance of audit independence; and
demonstrates that there are already adequate safeguards —including a number of recently adopted
measures —to maintain and improve the quality of audited financial information.
In brief, mandatory audit firm rotation is not necessary or appropriate because:
— Audits are strengthened by institutional continuity. It is a significant benefit to be well acquainted
with a client’s business, operations and controls. Experience shows that allegations of audit failure
occur much more frequently when a firm is in its first couple of years as a company’s auditors.
— Audit firm rotation is disruptive, time consuming and would increase overall audit costs.
— Key individuals involved in the audit process —audit firm personnel, client management and audit
committee members —all change in the normal course of events anyway.
— Audit committees are in the best position to evaluate the desirability of changing auditors.
— Growing public expectations, regulatory changes and recent professional initiatives have all served to
improve the auditing and financial reporting processes as well as to create an environment for ongoing
improvement without the undesirable consequences of mandatory rotation.

MANDATORY ROTATION OF AUDIT FIRMS
Those who recommend mandatory rotation of audit firms believe that the auditors’focus is on maintaining
a long-term economic relationship with a particular client and that this may compromise the auditors’
objectivity and affect the way in which he or she discharges professional responsibilities. These critics
believe that retaining the engagement becomes the auditors’priority. The concerns they have raised are:12
1. Auditors tend to grow too close to the client’s management. They begin to identify with management’s
problems and lose the requisite skepticism. Under rotation, a new audit firm would bring a fresh
viewpoint.
2. Auditors become stale, viewing the examination as a repeat of earlier engagements with the same client.
This fosters a tendency to anticipate results rather than keeping alert to subtle but important
changes in client circumstances.
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3. Auditors are tempted to smooth over problem areas in order to retain the engagement over the long
term. If this happens, pleasing client management becomes the auditors’ priority, rather than following
professional standards. If the tenure of the audit firm were limited, auditors would have greater
incentive to resist management pressure.
Litigation against accounting firms frequently alleges that the auditors compromised their objectivity
to maintain the client relationship. While the majority of cases brought against auditors are dismissed
or reach a favorable conclusion with respect to the auditors’ performance, the mere frequency with
which auditors are alleged to have “gone along with” client management makes an audit firm rotation
requirement superficially appealing to some.

THE CASE AGAINST MANDATORY AUDIT FIRM ROTATION
While there is no empirical evidence to support the perceived benefit of mandatory audit firm rotation,
there are a number of reasons why required rotation would be undesirable. The most significant are
summarized below. Furthermore, it should be recognized that virtually every group that has studied this
suggestion over the years, including the Public Oversight Board, Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities
and National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, has concluded that the perceived
benefits of rotating audit firms are clearly outweighed by the associated costs.

AUDITS IMPROVE WITH CONTINUITY
First and foremost, an audit firm rotation requirement intended to improve the objectivity of auditors
and therefore the quality of audits is likely to have exactly the opposite effect. Problem audits occur
much more frequently when the auditor lacks a solid base of experience with the client’s business, oper
ations and systems. Indications of the relationship between alleged audit failures and the lack of audit
experience with the client come from a number of sources:
• The Quality Control Inquiry Committee of the SEC Practice Section —part of the AICPA’s selfregulatory program that reviews litigation and other indications of audit deficiencies involving member
firms to determine if quality control improvements are warranted—has analyzed 406 cases of alleged
audit failure that were considered between 1979 and 1991. This analysis showed that allegations of
audit failure occur almost three times as often when the audit firm is performing its first or second
audit of the company.
• In its 1987 report, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting stated that “the
Commission’s review of fraud-related cases revealed that a significant number involved companies
that had recently changed their independent public accountants. . . .” As a consequence, the
Commission recommended that the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section should strengthen its peer review
program by increasing the review of audit engagements involving public company clients new to a
firm. That recommendation was promptly adopted by the SEC Practice Section.
• The independent Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (1974-78), chaired by former SEC Chairman
Manuel Cohen, stated, “(I)n the Commission’s study of cases of substandard performance by auditors,
several of the problem cases were first- or second-year audits. While not conclusive, this indicates the
higher peril associated with new audit clients. Once an auditor becomes well acquainted with the
operations of a client, audit risks are reduced. If a relationship between audit failures and new clients
does exist, rotation would increase the problem and be detrimental to users.”
Former SEC Chief Accountant John Burton summarizes the relationship between auditor changes and
audit problems:
“In the overwhelming majority of situations. . . the problem in these cases arose from too little
involvement by the auditors in the activities of their clients, rather than too much. A significant
proportion of the cases arose in initial audits where the main pattern was normally one of the
client misleading the auditor rather than conspiring with him.”1
1John C. Burton, “A Critical Look at Professionalism and Scope of Services,” Journal o f Accountancy, April 1980, page 50.
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ROTATION WOULD INCREASE COSTS— DECREASE EFFICIENCY
Not only would the risk of audit failure increase, but mandatory auditor rotation would raise costs for
firms, their audit clients and the public. Each time rotation occurred, management would face the prospect
of a disruptive, time-consuming and expensive process of selecting new auditors and familiarizing them
with the company’s operations, procedures, systems and industry environment. Moreover, efficiencies
developed by the prior auditing firm would be lost, again raising costs.
Then SEC Commissioner Phillip Lochner described this problem well in the January 1991 issue of
The Accountant. Specifically, he noted that “As far as rotating auditors is concerned, it would
substantially increase the cost of audits. Every X number of years, you would have to bring in and
educate a whole new group of auditors. There are advantages to having an auditor who knows the
business and the people.”

ROTATION OCCURS IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS ANYWAY
Increasing global competition is a dynamic component of today’s society. In this environment, forced rota
tion of audit firms would add unnecessarily to the many significant changes that are already
required of business to remain healthy and competitive. Such changes involve, among others,
transitions in company management. As a matter of fact, as managers come and go or assume
different responsibilities, auditor continuity provides a useful benchmark and experience to new executives.
To illustrate the current extent of management turnover in the United States, a review of the executive
management of the largest 100 industrial concerns listed in the 1991 Fortune “500” shows the following
management turnover:
— 7% of their chief executive officers have been employed by the company for less than five years; 47 %
hold their current position for under five years.
— 30% of their chief financial officers have been with the organization for less than five years; 68% hold
the CFO position for less than five years.
A review of the executive management of the 50 largest bank holding companies at December 31, 1990
is presented below:
— 30% of their chief executive officers have been employed by the company for less than five years;
58 % hold their current position for under five years.
— 56 % of their chief financial officers have been with the organization for less than five years; 84 % hold
the CFO position for less than five years.
These statistics indicate that management evolution alone, even without mandatory audit firm rotation,
tends to make the client management-auditor relationship a temporary one.
Furthermore, the audit firm personnel assigned to a particular client also periodically change enabling
ongoing opportunities for a “fresh look.” In fact, the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section requires a change in
the partner in charge of a public company audit at least every seven years. This membership
requirement was adopted for the specific purpose of periodically bringing a fresh perspective to each
audit without causing the detrimental effects of mandatory audit firm rotation.

THE EXPANDING ROLE OF AUDITORS
Propelled by changing client needs, growing public expectations and marketplace demands and oppor
tunities, the public accounting profession in the United States has changed dramatically over the years.
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Moreover, current developments —increasing global competition, more and more complex business
structures and transactions, the continual creation of new and innovative financial instruments, and
rapid technological breakthroughs, to cite only a few examples—will continue to affect the role and
responsibilities of the accounting profession.
Concurrently, the investing public and government are asking auditors to assume greater responsibility.
For example, the recent Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 includes a
new requirement for auditors’ reports on the internal control structure and procedures for financial
reporting and an institution’s compliance with certain specified laws and regulations relating to safety
and soundness. Furthermore, some believe financial statements should be changed to include forecasts
or other future-oriented information, which would have a significant effect on the auditor’s responsibility.
The profession is currently taking steps to address these and other challenges and opportunities.
Given this dynamic business environment and a desire for greater and more continuous auditor
involvement in the financial reporting process, the need for auditors to have a thorough understanding
of a client’s operations is becoming much more apparent. Robert K. Mautz, Vice Chairman of the Public
Oversight Board and Professor Emeritus of the University of Illinois and the University of Michigan
perhaps said it best in 1974, “the auditor well acquainted with the client has an advantage not
compensated for by new-broom alertness.”

AUDIT INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY
Maintaining public confidence in the integrity and objectivity of auditors is essential to the smooth
functioning of capital and debt markets. To maintain such confidence, the AICPA has long required
CPAs to be independent in performing audit and other attest services. Furthermore, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, other federal and state regulatory agencies, state legislatures, and state boards
of accountancy often include independence requirements in their laws and regulations.
Key factors that help to assure the objectivity, independence and professional behavior of public
accounting firms are summarized below:
• First, a firm’s greatest asset is its reputation. No firm should knowingly or deliberately sacrifice this
hard-earned reputation for short-term financial advantage or gain.
• Second, because auditing is a major source of revenue for most firms, a strong financial incentive
exists to protect and enhance the audit practice.
• Third, every firm represented in the AICPA is required by AICPA standards to develop and maintain
a system of quality control to protect audit quality and independence.
• Fourth, the profession’s peer review program critically evaluates firm-maintained controls, as well as
compliance with other professional standards.
• Fifth, the Securities and Exchange Commission investigates instances of suspected audit failure
involving public companies and brings enforcement actions against firms and individuals deemed
guilty of substandard performance.
• Sixth, the cost of litigation and the accompanying negative publicity are ever-present deterrents.
• Seventh, individual professionals recognize that unprofessional behavior will destroy their careers,
their livelihoods and possibly even their accumulated estates as well.
• Eighth, audit committees can and do closely monitor the quality, performance and independence of
outside auditors.

RECENT STEPS TO FURTHER PROMOTE THE QUALITY OF AUDITS
Despite the foregoing safeguards audit failures do occur. Because audits are subject to cost/benefit
constraints and are the product of human endeavor, a perfect record —no audit failures whatsoever —is
impossible to achieve. However, that has not diminished the profession’s commitment to the objective.
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Auditors have long understood that failures can destroy professional reputations and have carefully
approached their professional responsibilities accordingly. However, the profession’s extraordinary
commitment to new approaches to quality control and professional practice review in recent years
provides even further assurance to the public that audit firms will perform their expanding responsibilities
objectively and competently.
In addition to the factors noted previously, the following further measures help to maintain the quality
of audits:
• Every accounting firm with AICPA members must have a system of quality control and that system
must be reviewed by other CPAs every three years. This peer review requirement was first established
by the SEC and Private Companies Practice Sections —voluntary membership groups —of its Division
for CPA Firms in 1977. Because of its success, AICPA members voted in January 1988 to require all
firms with AICPA members to undergo a similar independent, triennial review and the Quality
Review Program for firms that are not members of the Division for CPA Firms was established.
• Beginning in 1990, auditors whose clients include SEC registrants have been required to be members
of the SEC Practice Section. As of December 31, 1991, 1,179 accounting firms (which together audit
over 14,400 SEC registered companies, that account for approximately 99% of the revenue of all such
companies) are members of the SEC Practice Section.
• The SEC Practice Section requires that its member firms rotate the engagement partner responsible
for the audit of a public company after seven years. This ensures that a fresh perspective is brought
to these engagements without sacrificing institutional knowledge of the client.
• Public company audits also must receive a second partner review prior to issuance of the audit report.
That second review cannot be performed by a partner with significant involvement in the performance
of the audit engagement itself.
• The SEC Practice Section —through its Quality Control Inquiry Committee —reviews and makes
inquiries regarding the quality control implications of alleged audit failures involving public clients
of member firms in order to identify and address in a timely fashion any quality control improvements that
may be needed.
• The peer review and other requirements of the SEC Practice Section are scrutinized and reported on
by both an independent Public Oversight Board and the SEC. The POB is an autonomous body
consisting of five distinguished individuals with a broad spectrum of business, professional, regulatory
and legislative experience. It carefully monitors all of the Section’s self-regulation programs and, in its
most recent annual report, concluded that such program “are suitably comprehensive and operating
in a manner that reasonably assures that member firms have appropriate quality control systems and
that they comply with them.” Similarly, the SEC, which has fully endorsed the peer review program
for many years, reported to Congress in 1991 that the quality control inquiry process provides added
assurances that major quality control deficiencies, if any, are timely identified and addressed in the
public interest.
• The SEC requires registrants to report publicly all accounting or auditing disagreements when an
auditor resigns, is removed or replaced, and peer reviewers are required to focus on such situations
in their triennial reviews. This inhibits companies from firing auditors with impunity.
• In addition, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees,
requires the auditor to discuss with the audit committee any disagreements with management about
significant issues, whether or not they are satisfactorily resolved. It became effective for audits of
financial statements beginning January 1, 1989.
• Other recent Statements on Auditing Standards include more stringent auditor responsibilities with
respect to
— detection and reporting of errors and irregularities
— illegal acts by clients
— consideration of the internal control structure in a financial statement audit
— communications of internal control weaknesses noted in an audit
— consideration of an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern and
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further improvements and refinements to generally accepted auditing standards are constantly under
consideration by the Auditing Standards Board.

CONCLUSION
Mandatory audit firm rotation would not enhance audit quality or strengthen investor confidence in the
objectivity of audits —already protected by numerous safeguards. To the contrary, rotation would be
very costly and counterproductive to the advancement of the public interest. Moreover, it would at least
be partly redundant since individual auditors responsible for the audits of public companies already
must rotate.
Based on a number of studies and years of audit experience, the profession strongly believes that mandatory
rotation would actually heighten the risk of audit failure by curtailing audit firms’ ability to get and keep
the in-depth institutional knowledge of a client entity and its business which is critical to early discovery
and resolution of problems that may threaten a business. The public interest lies in early warning and
the prompt correction of errors or abuses that threaten the entities in which people invest. We believe
audit firm rotation would retard progress toward this important goal.

(Adopted by the SEC Practice Section
Executive Committee March 24, 1992)
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